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Abstract:  We investigate implications of search and matching frictions in the labor market for 
inﬂation targeting interest rate policy in terms of equilibrium stability. When the interest rate is 
set in response to past or present inﬂation, determinacy of equilibrium is ensured similarly to 
comparable previous studies with frictionless labor markets. In stark contrast to these studies, 
indeterminacy is very likely if the interest rate is adjusted in response solely to expected future 
inﬂation. This is due to a vacancy channel of monetary policy that stems from the labor market 
frictions and renders inﬂation expectations self-fulﬁlling. The indeterminacy can be overcome 
once the interest rate is adjusted in response also to output or the unemployment rate or if the 
policy contains interest rate smoothing. When E-stability is adopted as an equilibrium selection 
criterion, a unique E-stable fundamental rational expectations equilibrium is generated under 
active, but not too strong, policy responses only to expected future inﬂation. This suggests that 
the problem is not critical from the perspective of learnability of the fundamental equilibrium. 
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There has recently been a surge of interest in the role of labor market search and matching
frictions along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models with sticky prices.1 Employment adjustment takes time and place at the
extensive margin, giving rise to equilibrium unemployment, and wages are determined by Nash
bargaining between workers and ¯rms. These features are in stark contrast with Walrasian
competitive labor markets, which have been used in the monetary policy literature.2
In this paper we examine implications of the labor market search and matching frictions
for in°ation targeting interest rate policy in terms of equilibrium stability. We consider three
policy speci¯cations, each of which adjusts the interest rate in response solely to either past
in°ation (backward-looking), present in°ation (current-looking) or expected future in°ation
(forward-looking). We show that the current-looking and the backward-looking policies ensure
(local) determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) under similar conditions to
those obtained in comparable previous studies with frictionless labor markets, such as Bullard
and Mitra (2002) and Woodford (2003). Determinacy is guaranteed under active policy re-
sponses to current in°ation or under active, but not too strong, ones to past in°ation. In stark
contrast to the previous studies, we ¯nd that the forward-looking policy is very likely to induce
indeterminacy, and thus makes excessively volatile REE possible. This ¯nding is critical be-
cause actual central banks, in°ation targeting ones in particular, are concerned about expected
future in°ation rather than actual past or present in°ation.
Why does the forward-looking policy render REE indeterminate? Passive policy does so,
due to the weakness of the conventional aggregate demand channel of monetary policy, as in line
with the previous studies. Active policy also induces indeterminacy in the presence of a vacancy
channel of monetary policy that stems from the labor market search and matching frictions.
This is in stark contrast with the previous studies and it occurs because the vacancy channel
makes in°ation expectations self-ful¯lling. The labor market frictions result in ¯rms' sluggish
adjustment in employment and hence output. Speci¯cally, ¯rms' reduction in vacancy posting,
induced by dampened consumption demand following a rise in the real interest rate, decreases
the level of employment available for production in current and future periods. Thus, the real
1See e.g. Christo®el and Kuester (2008), Krause and Lubik (2007), Krause, Lopez-Salido and Lubik (2008),
Ravenna and Walsh (2008), Sveen and Weinke (2008), Trigari (2008), Walsh (2005), Van Zandweghe (2007),
among others.
2Some recent exceptions are Blanchard and Gal¶ ³ (2008), Faia (2008) and Thomas (2008), who study optimal
monetary policy in the presence of frictional labor markets.
2interest rate rise lowers future output supply. At the same time, such a rate rise also prompts
households to substitute current with future consumption, so that ¯rms expect consumption
demand to recover in future periods after its current decline. From this expected rise in future
demand and the diminished future supply, ¯rms anticipate a strong expansion of future vacancy
posting, which raises expected future real marginal cost and hence expected future in°ation.
Therefore, the vacancy channel leads a rise in the real interest rate to increase expected future
in°ation. This renders in°ation expectations self-ful¯lling under su±ciently strong active policy
responses solely to expected future in°ation, thereby inducing indeterminacy of REE.
Actual labor markets are characterized by search and matching frictions, and likewise much
evidence suggests that monetary policy in major economies has been forward-looking especially
since 1979 (e.g. Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler, 1998). Yet the actual economy has not exhibited
excessive volatility in recent decades as the vacancy channel leads to predict.3 We examine two
possible explanations. The ¯rst one is interest rate smoothing or interest rate policy adjustment
for output or the unemployment rate in addition to expected future in°ation. We then ¯nd
that the policy adjustment for current output can overcome the indeterminacy as long as a long
run version of the Taylor principle is satis¯ed: in the long run the nominal interest rate should
be raised by more than the increase in in°ation. With a policy adjustment for expected future
output, this amelioration of the problem is limited to mild policy responses, since a strong
policy response to expected future output causes indeterminacy as in line with previous studies
with frictionless labor markets.4 The intuition for the amelioration is that indeterminacy is
induced by the vacancy channel of the forward-looking policy, in which a rise in the real interest
rate stemming from in°ationary expectations increases expected future in°ation and hence such
expectations become self-ful¯lling. But, the policy adjustment for current or expected future
output subdues the real interest rate rise because output falls as a consequence of such a rate
rise. With an interest rate policy reaction to the unemployment rate we ¯nd that the forward-
looking policy brings about determinacy when it satis¯es an associated long run version of the
Taylor principle. This is because in our model the unemployment rate changes proportionally to
°uctuations in production, so that the policy reaction to the unemployment rate yields almost
the same result as the one to current output. Finally, we consider interest rate smoothing and
¯nd that it helps the forward-looking policy generate determinacy. Such smoothing implies
3On the contrary, there is ample evidence of a moderation of U.S. economic aggregates since 1984.
4The upper bound on the policy coe±cient on expected future output that guarantees determinacy is induced
by the demand channel of monetary policy, as mentioned later.
3policy responses to lagged interest rates and hence makes the forward-looking policy respond
also to current and past in°ation like the current-looking and the backward-looking policies,
thereby ameliorating the indeterminacy problem. These results provide an additional argument
in favor of °exible interest rate policy instead of strict in°ation targeting, and the policies thus
constitute prescriptions for the indeterminacy.
Next, we consider expectational (or E-)stability as an REE selection criterion and examine
whether the forward-looking policy generates a unique E-stable fundamental REE even in cases
of indeterminacy.5 As Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show in a broad class of linear stochastic
models, if a fundamental REE is E-stable, it is least-squares learnable, i.e. stable under least-
squares learning. Therefore, E-stability is an essential condition for any REE to be regarded as
plausible, as stressed by McCallum (2003).6 We ¯nd that a unique E-stable fundamental REE is
generated under active, but not too strong, policy responses solely to expected future in°ation.
This is in stark contrast with Bullard and Mitra (2002), who show that the Taylor principle
(i.e. active policy) is a necessary and su±cient condition for the unique E-stable REE in the
absence of the labor market search and matching frictions. The presence of such frictions makes
the Taylor principle no longer a su±cient condition. Since the interval of the policy coe±cient
on expected future in°ation that generates the unique E-stable REE is wide enough to contain
all empirically relevant values, our E-stability result suggests that the indeterminacy problem
induced by the forward-looking policy is not critical from the perspective of E-stability or
least-squares learnability of fundamental REE.
The ¯ndings above are based on our benchmark model in which consumption preferences
are standard, job destruction is exogenous and hiring is instantaneous. These ¯ndings remain
unchanged qualitatively even when we introduce habit formation in consumption preferences
or when we consider an alternative labor market speci¯cation in which jobs are also endoge-
nously destroyed and new hires become productive in the subsequent period, which is a more
conventional one used in previous studies such as Trigari (2008), Walsh (2005) and Krause and
Lubik (2007).
5Throughout the paper, \fundamental" refers to Evans and Honkapohja's (2001) minimal state variable
(MSV) solutions to linear RE models so as to distinguish them from McCallum's (1983) original MSV solution.
We do not examine E-stability of non-fundamental REE such as sunspot equilibria, which may exist in cases
of indeterminacy. For E-stability analysis of these REE, see e.g. Honkapohja and Mitra (2004), Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2004) and Evans and McGough (2005), who all use associated models with frictionless labor markets.
We leave E-stability analysis of non-fundamental REE in our model for future work.
6McCallum (2003) argues that in cases of indeterminacy there may be a unique REE that is E-stable and
thus least-squares learnable, whereas a determinate REE that is E-unstable and thus not least-squares learnable
is arguably not a plausible candidate for equilibrium that could be observed in the actual economy.
4Among related literature, Burda and Weder (2002), Giammarioli (2003), and Krause and
Lubik (2004) analyze equilibrium determinacy in real business cycle models with labor mar-
ket search and matching frictions, yielding no implication for monetary policy. Zanetti (2006)
investigates monetary policy implications using a sticky price model in which wages and em-
ployment are determined via simultaneous Nash bargaining, but such a model involves no search
and matching frictions. To our knowledge, the present paper is the ¯rst to examine monetary
policy implications of labor market search and matching frictions in terms of determinacy and
E-stability of REE.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an optimizing model with
sticky prices and labor market search and matching frictions. Section 3 analyzes determinacy of
REE under three alternative speci¯cations of in°ation targeting interest rate policy. Section 4
considers prescriptions for the indeterminacy problem induced by the forward-looking policy.
Section 5 assesses the problem from the perspective of E-stability. Section 6 contains some
robustness analysis in which habit formation is introduced in consumption preferences or a
more conventional labor market speci¯cation is used. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 A model with labor market search and matching frictions
Our model is an optimizing model with sticky prices and labor market search and matching
frictions. This model is in line with recent business cycle studies, such as Christo®el and Kuester
(2008), Krause and Lubik (2007), Krause, Lopez-Salido and Lubik (2008), Ravenna and Walsh
(2008), Sveen and Weinke (2008), Trigari (2008), Walsh (2005), and Van Zandweghe (2007).
But, it is in stark contrast to recent monetary policy studies with competitive labor markets
in that employment adjustment is costly and takes place at the extensive margin, which gives
rise to equilibrium unemployment, and wages are determined by Nash bargaining.
The model economy consists of four types of agents: households, perfectly competitive
wholesale ¯rms, monopolistically competitive retail ¯rms, and a monetary authority.7 We
describe each in turn.
7As in recent monetary policy studies, we assume that ¯scal policy is `Ricardian', i.e. it appropriately ac-
commodates consequences of monetary policy for the government budget constraint. We thus leave hidden
the government budget constraint and ¯scal policy. For recent analyses of equilibrium determinacy under non-
Ricardian ¯scal policy and interest rate policy, see e.g. Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2001), Benhabib
and Eusepi (2005), Linnemann (2006) and Kurozumi (2005).
52.1 Households
In the economy there is a continuum of households. To avoid distributional issues, we assume
as in Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) that employed and unemployed households pool
consumption. Thus, we can consider the presence of a representative household. This household
purchases Ct consumption goods, supplies one unit of labor inelastically, and holds Bt nominal
one-period bonds, which earn the gross nominal interest rate Rt in the subsequent period. The








under the budget constraint
PtCt + Bt · PtDt + Bt¡1Rt¡1;
where ¯ 2 (0;1) is a discount factor, ¾ > 0 measures (relative) risk aversion, gt is a preference
shock, Dt is real income that consists of monopoly pro¯ts from retail ¯rms, rents related to labor
market frictions from wholesale ¯rms, either a wage wt from employment or a bene¯t b when
unemployed, minus a lump-sum transfer to ¯nance unemployment bene¯ts. The disutility from
employment is normalized to zero. Consumption Ct = [
R 1
0 Ct(i)(²¡1)=²di]²=(²¡1) is a composite
of di®erentiated goods produced by retail ¯rms, with an elasticity of substitution ² > 1. Thus,
cost-minimizing demand for good i is given by Ct(i) = [Pt(i)=Pt]









The optimality conditions for consumption and bond holdings are given by
¸t = C¡¾




where ¸t=Pt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint and ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1 is the gross
in°ation rate. These conditions yield the consumption Euler equation
C¡¾





Wholesale ¯rms use labor as the only input in production and sell homogeneous goods at a
price Pw
t to retail ¯rms in a perfectly competitive market. The labor market is characterized
6by search and matching frictions. The population size is normalized to one. The time line of
period t is as follows. At the beginning of the period there are nt¡1 matches between workers and
wholesale ¯rms. Then, a proportion ½ 2 (0;1) of the existing matches is exogenously destroyed,
thus job destruction equals ½nt¡1.8 These workers join the pool of searching workers, so that
the measure of search unemployment is
ut = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½)nt¡1: (3)
Next, ut searching workers and vt vacancies participate in the matching market, giving rise to
mt new matches (i.e. job creation), a number increasing in search unemployment and vacancies




t , where Ã > 0 and » 2 (0;1)
is the search elasticity of matches. We assume as in Blanchard and Gal¶ ³ (2008) and Ravenna
and Walsh (2008) that new matches become productive instantaneously.9 Thus, the number
of worker-¯rm matches that produce in period t is given by
nt = (1 ¡ ½)nt¡1 + mt; (4)
where the change in employment is equal to the di®erence between job creation and job de-
struction. Then, the unemployment rate is
Ut = 1 ¡ nt: (5)
Each worker-¯rm match produces one unit of wholesale goods in every period, so that
aggregate production of the wholesale sector is






measures the tightness of the labor market. An unmatched wholesale ¯rm's probability to ¯ll







8The exogenous job destruction rate is empirically supported by Hall (2006) and Shimer (2007), who argue
that the job separation rate explains only a small fraction of °uctuations in the unemployment rate.
9In Section 6.2 we analyze a more conventional timing in which new matches become productive in the
subsequent period and contemporaneous employment adjustment takes place only via job destruction.
7which rises when the labor market becomes slack. A searching worker's probability to ¯nd a







which is increasing in labor market tightness.
Job creation is costly for wholesale ¯rms, which must pay a ¯xed cost ° > 0 each period
they post vacancies. This cost gives rise to a joint surplus from a match, which is split between
the matched worker and ¯rm through Nash bargaining. To determine a wage that gives the
worker his/her share of the bargain, it is convenient to consider asset values of matched and
unmatched workers and ¯rms. The asset value of a matched ¯rm, Fm
t , is the sum of real net
revenue that accrues to the ¯rm in the current period and the discounted present value of this
¯rm in the next period. The match is dissolved with probability ½, so that the value of a
matched ¯rm is given by
Fm
t = zt ¡ wt + Et¯t;t+1[(1 ¡ ½)Fm
t+1 + ½Fu
t+1];
where ¯t;t+j = ¯j¸t+j=¸t is the stochastic discount factor, zt = Pw
t =Pt is the real price of
wholesale goods, and Fu
t is the asset value of an unmatched ¯rm in period t. An unmatched
¯rm pays the vacancy posting cost and is matched with probability qt. Since new matches
become productive instantaneously, the value of an unmatched ¯rm is given by
Fu
t = ¡° + qtFm
t + (1 ¡ qt)Et¯t;t+1Fu
t+1:
Free entry in the matching market drives the asset value of an unmatched ¯rm to zero in
equilibrium. Combining these ¯rm asset values yields a job creation condition that makes the
expected cost of a match equal its expected value
°
qt




The asset value of a matched (unmatched) worker is the wage (unemployment bene¯t) plus the
expected present discounted value of this worker's employment status in the next period
Wm
t = wt + Et¯t;t+1
©
[1 ¡ ½(1 ¡ pt+1)]Wm





t = b + Et¯t;t+1
©
pt+1Wm




The Nash bargaining outcome ´Fm
t = (1¡´)(Wm
t ¡Wu
t ), where ´ 2 (0;1) is the worker's share
of the surplus (i.e. the worker bargaining power), then results in the wage equation
wt = ´
·




+ (1 ¡ ´)b:
8The worker is compensated for a fraction ´ of ¯rm revenue and the hiring cost that the ¯rm
expects to save thanks to the match. In addition, the worker is compensated for a fraction









There is a continuum of retail ¯rms i 2 [0;1], each of which produces one unit of di®erentiated
good i from one unit of wholesale goods and sells a quantity Yt(i) of good i to households in
a monopolistically competitive market. Cost minimization implies that each retail ¯rm's real
marginal cost is equal to the wholesale goods' real price zt. Then, facing households' demand
Yt(i) = Ct(i) = [Pt(i)=Pt]
¡² Ct, each retail ¯rm chooses its pro¯t-maximizing price subject to
Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) style price stickiness. That is, each period a fraction ® of retail
¯rms does not reoptimize price and instead adjusts it for steady state in°ation ¼, while the





























If prices are perfectly °exible (i.e. ® = 0), (11) reduces to Pt(i) = [²=(² ¡ 1)]Ptzt, which shows
that 1=z = ²=(²¡1) is the steady state markup of each retail ¯rm's price over its marginal cost.
In the presence of price stickiness, the ¯rm's actual markup di®ers from, but tends toward, the
steady state markup.
2.4 Monetary authority
The monetary authority conducts in°ation targeting policy that adjusts the interest rate in






; j = ¡1;0;1; (12)
where R is the steady state nominal interest rate and Á¼ is a non-negative policy coe±cient on
in°ation. These three policy speci¯cations are referred to as, respectively, backward-looking
(j = ¡1), current-looking (j = 0) and forward-looking (j = 1) in what follows.
92.5 Equilibrium and calibration
A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a set of processes for all the endogenous variables
satisfying (1)¡(12), the aggregate resource constraint yt = Yt + °vt, and the market clearing
condition Yt(i) = Ct(i) for each retail good i 2 [0;1], which implies Yt = ¢t Ct, where ¢t ´
R 1
0 [Pt(i)=Pt]
¡² di measures relative price dispersion across retail ¯rms. Log-linearizing these
equilibrium conditions around the steady state and rearranging the resulting equations yields




^ nt = (1 ¡ ½)^ nt¡1 + ½
³
^ vt ¡ »^ µt
´
; (14)
»^ µt = Â^ zt + ¯(1 ¡ ½)(» ¡ ´p)Et^ µt+1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ´p)
³
^ Rt ¡ Et^ ¼t+1
´
; (15)
^ nt = s c ^ Ct + s v^ vt; (16)
^ Ct = Et ^ Ct+1 ¡ ¾¡1
³
^ Rt ¡ Et^ ¼t+1
´
+ ¾¡1(gt ¡ Etgt+1); (17)
^ ¼t = ¯Et^ ¼t+1 + ·^ zt; (18)
^ Rt = Á¼Et^ ¼t+j; j = ¡1;0;1; (19)
where Â ´ z(1 ¡ ´)=(°=q) > 0, s v ´ °v=y is the steady state vacancy creation share of
production, s c ´ 1 ¡ °v=y is the steady state consumption share of production, and · ´
(1¡®)(1¡®¯)=® > 0 is the real marginal cost elasticity of in°ation. The preference shock, gt,
is assumed to follow a stationary ¯rst order autoregressive process with a parameter ½ g 2 (¡1;1)
and a white noise "t
gt = ½ ggt¡1 + "t: (20)
In the presence of search and matching frictions in the labor market, ¯rms' adjustment in
employment and output is persistent and as a consequence, the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy consists of a vacancy channel in addition to an aggregate demand channel
which is the only channel in the absence of the labor market frictions. One point here is that
these two channels have opposing e®ects on in°ation. To see this, consider the e®ect of a
rise in the real interest rate. Then, households reduce their current consumption according to
the Euler equation (17). This decreases retail ¯rms' current output because of monopolistic
competition and hence dampens these ¯rms' current demand for wholesale goods. In response to
this dampened demand, wholesale ¯rms reduce current vacancy posting and hence the current
labor market becomes slack via (13), which lowers retail ¯rms' current real marginal cost via
10the job creation condition (15) because the labor market slackness decreases the hiring cost
and hence wholesale goods' price.10 Consequently, current in°ation is reduced via the Phillips
curve (18).11 This is the aggregate demand channel of monetary policy, through which a higher
real interest rate lowers current in°ation.
The vacancy channel of monetary policy, on the contrary, leads a rise in the real interest
rate to increase expected future and current in°ation. A real interest rate rise implies that
consumption demand is expected to recover in future periods after its current decline, and hence
expected future demand for wholesale goods increases above its current level. As explained just
above, the rate rise also reduces wholesale ¯rms' current vacancy posting and hence lowers the
level of employment available for production in the subsequent periods. Then, facing the
expected recovery in future demand, wholesale ¯rms anticipate a strong expansion of future
vacancy posting and hence a tightened future labor market, which in turn raises expected
future real marginal cost via the next-period job creation condition.12 Thus, expected future
and current in°ation is raised via the Phillips curve. This is the vacancy channel of monetary
policy that stems from the labor market frictions. As shown later, this vacancy channel induces
a possibility that in°ation expectations become self-ful¯lling and the REE is indeterminate if
active interest rate policy has su±ciently strong responses solely to expected future in°ation.
The ensuing analysis uses a realistic calibration of model parameters to illustrate conditions
for determinacy and E-stability. Our baseline calibration for the quarterly model is summarized
in Table 1. The discount factor ¯ = 0:99, the risk aversion ¾ = 1, the substitution elasticity
² = 10 yielding a steady state markup of 1=z = 1:11, and the probability of no price optimization
® = 0:67 as in line with recent literature such as Woodford (2003). The labor market parameters
are the worker bargaining power ´ = 0:5 following most of the literature on labor market search
and matching, the search elasticity of matches » = 0:4 based on the empirical estimates of
Blanchard and Diamond (1989), the ¯rm matching rate q = 0:7 and the job destruction rate
½ = 0:1 taken from den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), the steady state unemployment rate
U = 1 ¡ n of six percent as in Walsh (2005), and the vacancy posting cost ° = 0:06 consistent
10The real interest rate rise also reduces the labor market tightness directly by lowering the expected value of
a match in the job creation condition (15). But, under realistic calibrations, this e®ect is weak enough to ensure
procyclical real marginal cost.
11This transmission can also be explained from the perspective of the wholesale goods market. This market
is perfectly competitive, and wholesale goods' real price is equal to retail ¯rms' real marginal cost because such
goods are the only input in retail ¯rms' production. Therefore, the dampened current demand for wholesale
goods drives current real marginal cost downward.
12Again, this can be explained from the perspective of the wholesale goods market. The expected rise in future
demand for wholesale goods drives retail ¯rms' expected future real marginal cost upward.
11with the value implied by the steady state with endogenous job destruction in Walsh (2005).
The steady state relationships then imply values for the remaining parameters: p, u, s c, s v.
3 Equilibrium determinacy under interest rate policy
In the model presented above, we examine implications of the labor market search and matching
frictions for in°ation targeting interest rate policy in terms of determinacy of REE.
3.1 Forward-looking policy
We begin with the case of the forward-looking policy, i.e. j = 1 in (12). The system of log-
linearized equilibrium conditions (13)¡(20) can be reduced to a system of the form
Etxt+1 = Axt + Bgt; (21)
where xt = [^ ¼t ^ Ct ^ nt¡1]0 and the coe±cient matrix A is given in Appendix A.13 In this
system the two variables ^ ¼t and ^ Ct are non-predetermined, while the remaining one, ^ nt¡1, is
predetermined. Therefore, determinacy of REE is generated if and only if the coe±cient matrix
A has exactly one eigenvalue inside the unit circle and the other two outside the unit circle.14
We thus obtain the following proposition using Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003).
Proposition 1 The forward-looking policy, i.e. j = 1 in (12), ensures determinacy of REE if
and only if either of the following two cases is satis¯ed.
Case I: (22), (23), and (24) or (25) hold.
Á ¼ > 1; (22)
Á ¼ < 1 +
2Â¾a1(1 + ¯)
·fs c(2u ¡ ½)[» + ¯(1 ¡ ½)(» ¡ ´p)] ¡ 2¯¾a1(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ´p)g
; (23)
b3(b3 ¡ b1) + b2 > 1 or jb1j > 3; (24)
Á ¼ > 1 +
Â¾[½(1 ¡ ») ¡ s v]
·(1 ¡ ½)fs c(» ¡ ´p) ¡ ¾(1 ¡ ´p)[½(1 ¡ ») ¡ s v]g
; (25)
where a1 = ½(1 ¡ »)[u ¡ sv(1 ¡ u)] ¡ s v(2u ¡ ½) and bi, i = 1;2;3, are given in Appendix B.
Case II: the two strict inequalities opposite to (22) and (23) hold and (24) or the strict
inequality opposite to (25) holds.
Proof See Appendix B.
13The form of the vector B is omitted since it is not needed in what follows.
14To be precise, this condition is su±cient for determinacy but only generically necessary. Throughout the
paper, consideration of non-generic boundary cases is omitted.
12We illustrate the conditions for determinacy with the baseline calibration. Determinacy
obtains for a very narrow interval of the policy coe±cient on expected future in°ation, 1 <
Á ¼ < 1:16. Therefore, the forward-looking policy is very likely to render the REE indeterminate.
Note that Case I is the empirically relevant condition for determinacy, since Case II cannot
obtain with realistic calibrations of the model parameters including the baseline one. The lower
bound of the determinacy interval is of course given by Taylor principle (22), while the upper
bound is induced by the ¯rst inequality of (24), which limits the policy coe±cient on expected
future in°ation very severely. This is in stark contrast to Proposition 4 of Bullard and Mitra
(2002) and Proposition 4.5 of Woodford (2003), which show that in the absence of the labor
market search and matching frictions the forward-looking policy ensures determinacy if and
only if it satis¯es the Taylor principle but its response to expected future in°ation is not too
strong, 1 < Á ¼ < 1 + 2(1 + ¯)=· = 25 under the baseline calibration.15
What causes the forward-looking policy to induce indeterminacy of REE? Indeterminacy is
induced by any in°ation coe±cient less than one, due to the weakness of the demand channel of
monetary policy. That is, passive policy makes the REE indeterminate, as in line with previous
monetary policy literature. It is also induced by any in°ation coe±cient greater than 1.16 in
the presence of the vacancy channel of monetary policy that stems from the labor market
search and matching frictions. As noted above, this vacancy channel leads a rise in the real
interest rate to increase expected future in°ation and therefore makes in°ation expectations
self-ful¯lling if the forward-looking policy has su±ciently strong responses solely to expected
future in°ation. Consequently, the REE fails to be determinate. Only if the policy coe±cient
lies in the very narrow interval of (1,1.16), the e®ect of the vacancy channel is negligible and
hence a determinate REE is generated.
The indeterminacy result is robust with respect to the model parameters. As sensitivity
analysis, we consider how the upper bound on the policy coe±cient on expected future in°ation
changes for alternative values of parameters that determine the e®ect of the vacancy channel
of monetary policy. As noted above, two factors give rise to the vacancy channel: the sluggish
adjustment in output due to the labor market frictions and the expected recovery of future
consumption after a rise in the real interest rate. Thus, the e®ect of the vacancy channel
depends on the sluggishness of the labor market holding back the adjustment in future output
15In this policy coe±cient interval, · is the real marginal cost elasticity of in°ation, but not the output (gap)
elasticity of in°ation, which is given by ·=¾ and appears in the determinacy interval of the policy coe±cient
given in Proposition 4 of Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Proposition 4.5 of Woodford (2003).
13and on the strength of the recovery of expected future consumption in response to real interest
rate changes.16 In the labor market, we can see from the labor market tightness (13) and the
employment motion law (14) that the dynamics of employment and output are determined
by the proportion of separations ½, the steady state unemployment rate U, and the search
elasticity of matches ». A small ½ implies via (14) that changes in current output persist
strongly into the future and that current vacancies have a small e®ect on employment creation.
Therefore, a smaller ½ makes the labor market more sluggish and hence the indeterminacy
problem is worsened. For a small value of ½ = 0:07 (e.g. Merz, 1995) the interval of the
in°ation coe±cient for which determinacy is ensured becomes 1 < Á ¼ < 1:13, while for a large
value of ½ = 0:15 (e.g. Andolfatto, 1996) it widens to 1 < Á ¼ < 1:20. A large U reduces the
employment coe±cient (1 ¡ u)=u in (13) and thus, in combination with (14), employment has
a more persistent e®ect on expected future employment. As a consequence, the determinacy
interval becomes narrower for a larger steady state unemployment rate; e.g. if U = 0:12 (0:03)
this interval is 1 < Á ¼ < 1:10 (1:29).17 A reduction of » dampens the ¯rm matching rate's
response to changes in labor market tightness. This increases the sluggishness of the labor
market by making expected future employment more sensitive to current employment via (13)
and (14). But it also raises the proportion of newly matched vacancies and dampens the rise
of the expected cost of a match in response to a tightening labor market. For a small value
of » = 0:235 (Hall, 2005) the determinacy interval narrows to 1 < Á ¼ < 1:11, while for a large
value of » = 0:5 (e.g. Krause, Lopez-Salido and Lubik, 2008) it becomes 1 < Á ¼ < 1:26. As for
the strength of the recovery of expected future consumption in response to real interest rate
changes, it is determined entirely by households' degree of risk aversion ¾, the inverse of which
measures the intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption. A smaller degree of risk
aversion makes consumption movements more sensitive to real interest rate changes, resulting
in a strong expected growth of future consumption after a real interest rate rise. Consequently,
the determinacy interval becomes narrower for a smaller ¾; e.g. if ¾ = 0:16 (Woodford, 2003)
and ¾ = 5 (McCallum and Nelson, 1999), the REE is determinate for 1 < Á ¼ < 1:03 and
1 < Á ¼ < 1:35, respectively.
16The other parameter that determines the e®ect of the vacancy channel is the probability of not optimizing
price ®, which measures price stickiness. A smaller ® increases the real marginal cost elasticity of in°ation
· = (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ®¯)=®, which strengthens the vacancy channel e®ect and hence the indeterminacy problem
deteriorates; e.g. if ® = 0:5 (0:8), the determinacy interval is 1 < Á ¼ < 1:05 (1:50).
17The determinacy interval for alternative unemployment rates is obtained by keeping the job ¯nding rate p
at its baseline value implied by U = 0:06, to isolate the e®ect of U on the dynamics. The change in p implied
by a change in U would have an opposing e®ect on the length of the determinacy interval.
143.2 Current-looking and backward-looking policies
We turn next to the current-looking and the backward-looking policies, i.e. j = 0 and j = ¡1
in (12). These policies yield, respectively, third and fourth order characteristic equations for
the systems' coe±cient matrices and then determinacy requires that exactly two solutions to
these equations be outside the unit circle and the others lie inside the unit circle. To our
knowledge, there is no general result about conditions under which fourth order equations
have such solutions, and thus we investigate the backward-looking policy numerically. For the
current-looking policy we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The current-looking policy, i.e. j = 0 in (12), ensures determinacy of REE if
and only if either of the following two cases is satis¯ed.
Case I: (22), (26), and (27) or (28) hold.
Á ¼ > ¡1 ¡
2Â¾a1(1 + ¯)
·fs c(2u ¡ ½)[» + ¯(1 ¡ ½)(» ¡ ´p)] ¡ 2¯¾a1(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ´p)g
; (26)
c3(c3 ¡ c1) + c2 > 1 or jc1j > 3; (27)
¡1 >
Â¾[½(1 ¡ ») ¡ s v]
·(1 ¡ ½)fs c(» ¡ ´p) ¡ ¾(1 ¡ ´p)[½(1 ¡ ») ¡ s v]g
; (28)
where a1 is given in Proposition 1 and ci, i = 1;2;3, are given in Appendix C.
Case II: the two strict inequalities opposite to (22) and (26) hold and (27) or the strict
inequality opposite to (28) holds.
Proof See Appendix C.
Under the baseline calibration, the current-looking policy guarantees determinacy of REE
if and only if Taylor principle (22) is satis¯ed, i.e. Á ¼ > 1. In that calibrated case, (26) and
the ¯rst inequality of (27) are satis¯ed, such that (22) generates determinacy. The backward-
looking policy ensures determinacy as long as it meets the Taylor principle but its response
to past in°ation is not too strong, 1 < Á ¼ < 10:4 under the baseline calibration; otherwise,
it induces indeterminacy for 0 · Á ¼ < 1 and makes the REE explosive for Á ¼ ¸ 10:4. These
results are robust with respect to any realistic value of each model parameter and are in line
with Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Woodford (2003) who consider the case of a frictionless
labor market.18
18For unrealistically large values of the risk aversion ¾, active current-looking and backward-looking policies
induce indeterminacy; e.g. in the case of ¾ = 15, the current-looking policy with 2:16 · Á ¼ · 91:66 and the
backward-looking policy with 4:91 · Á ¼ · 19:08 render REE indeterminate.
154 Prescriptions for the indeterminacy problem
We have shown that the forward-looking policy is very likely to render the REE indetermi-
nate due to the vacancy channel of monetary policy that stems from the labor market search
and matching frictions. In this section we consider three prescriptions for this indeterminacy












; k = 0;1; (29)
where ÁR, ÁY , ÁU are non-negative policy coe±cients on the lagged interest rate, current or
expected future output and the unemployment rate. The log-linearization of (29) is given by
^ Rt = ÁR ^ Rt¡1 + Á¼Et^ ¼t+1 + ÁY Et^ Yt+k ¡ ÁU ^ Ut; k = 0;1; (30)
where ^ Ut = Ut¡U. The ¯rst prescription is the policy adjustment for current or expected future
output in addition to expected future in°ation. Second, we consider interest rate smoothing,
i.e. the policy response to the lagged interest rate. These two are motivated by empirical
studies such as Clarida, Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1998, 2000) and Orphanides (2004), who use them
as a good description of actual monetary policy conducted in industrialized countries. The last
prescription is the policy reaction to the unemployment rate. Blanchard and Gal¶ ³ (2008) and
Faia (2008) ¯nd that interest rate policy with responses to in°ation and unemployment rates
can approximate well optimal policy responses to shocks in a sticky price model with labor
market frictions.
4.1 Policy response to output
We ¯rst investigate whether the policy response to current or expected future output as well
as expected future in°ation, i.e. ÁR = ÁU = 0 in (29), can resolve the indeterminacy problem
induced by the forward-looking policy.
In the case of the policy response to expected future output, k = 1 in (29), the system
consisting of (13)¡(18), (20) and (30) can be reduced to a system of the same form as (21)
with a di®erent coe±cient matrix A given in Appendix A. Analyzing this coe±cient matrix
yields the following proposition.

















16Proposition 3 Suppose ÁY 6= ¾. If the forward-looking policy responds also to expected future
output, i.e. k = 1, ÁR = ÁU = 0 in (29), it ensures determinacy of REE if and only if either
of the following two cases is satis¯ed.
Case I: (31), (32), and (33) or (34) hold.
Á ¼ +
Â(1 ¡ ¯)[u(1 ¡ ») ¡ »(s v=s c)]
·[» ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ½)(» ¡ ´p)]
ÁY > 1; (31)
Á ¼ < 1 +
Âa1(1 + ¯)(2¾ ¡ Á Y )
·fs c(2u ¡ ½)[» + ¯(1 ¡ ½)(» ¡ ´p)] ¡ 2¯¾a1(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ´p)g
; (32)
d3(d3 ¡ d1) + d2 > 1 or jd1j > 3; (33)
Á ¼ > 1 +
Â[½(1 ¡ ») ¡ s v](¾ ¡ ÁY )
·(1 ¡ ½)fs c(» ¡ ´p) ¡ ¾(1 ¡ ´p)[½(1 ¡ ») ¡ s v]g
; (34)
where a1 is given in Proposition 1 and di, i = 1;2;3, are given in Appendix D.
Case II: the two strict inequalities opposite to (31) and (32) hold and (33) or the strict
inequality opposite to (34) holds.
Proof See Appendix D.
Like Bullard and Mitra (2002), Woodford (2003) and Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008),
(31) can be given the following economic interpretation. By equilibrium conditions (13)¡(18),
each percentage point of permanently higher in°ation implies a permanent increase in output of
Â(1¡¯)[u(1¡»)¡»(s v=s c)]=f·[»¡¯(1¡½)(»¡´p)]g percentage points. Hence the left-hand side
of (31) shows the long run rise in the nominal interest rate by policy (30) with ÁR = ÁU = 0
for each percentage point permanent increase in the in°ation rate. Therefore, (31) can be
interpreted as the long run version of the Taylor principle: in the long run the nominal interest
rate should be raised by more than the increase in in°ation.
Figure 1 illustrates a region of policy coe±cients on expected future in°ation and output
(Á¼;ÁY ) that generate determinacy under the baseline calibration. Case I is the empirically
relevant condition for determinacy, since Case II cannot obtain under realistic calibrations of
the model parameters including the baseline one. We can see that moderate policy adjustment
for expected future output ameliorates the indeterminacy problem. The lower bound on the
in°ation coe±cient Á¼ is given by Taylor principle (31). The ¯rst inequality of condition (33)
yields an upper bound on the in°ation coe±cient and allows a much wider determinacy interval
of the in°ation coe±cient as the output coe±cient ÁY increases. However, once it increases
beyond a certain threshold given by the intersection of (32) and (33), the determinacy interval
becomes narrower due to (32), which imposes the upper bound on the in°ation and output
17coe±cients. This upper bound is induced by the demand channel of monetary policy because
we can see the corresponding one in Figure 3 of Bullard and Mitra (2002) who examine the
case of a frictionless labor market, in which monetary policy contains only the demand channel
and the upper bound limits the determinacy region more severely. The intuition for this
amelioration of the indeterminacy problem is as follows. Indeterminacy is induced by the
vacancy channel of the forward-looking policy, in which a rise in the real interest rate stemming
from in°ationary expectations increases expected future in°ation. But, the policy response to
expected future output subdues such a rate rise because this output falls as a consequence of
the rate rise. Hence, an expected recovery of future consumption following the real interest
rate rise is subdued and the expected need for more future vacancies is prevented. Therefore,
determinacy is generated.
In the case of the policy response to current output, k = 0 in (29), a similar analysis of the
system's coe±cient matrix A given in Appendix A yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the forward-looking policy responds also to current output, i.e. k = 0, ÁR =
ÁU = 0 in (29), it ensures determinacy of REE if and only if either of the following two cases
is satis¯ed.
Case I: (31), (35), and (36) or (25) hold.
Á ¼ < 1 +
Âa1(1 + ¯)(2¾ + Á Y )
·fs c(2u ¡ ½)[» + ¯(1 ¡ ½)(» ¡ ´p)] ¡ 2¯¾a1(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ´p)g
; (35)
e3(e3 ¡ e1) + e2 > 1 or je1j > 3; (36)
where a1 is given in Proposition 1 and ei, i = 1;2;3, are given in Appendix E.
Case II: the two strict inequalities opposite to (31) and (35) hold and (36) or the strict
inequality opposite to (25) holds.
Proof See Appendix E.
If the forward-looking policy responds also to current output, the long run version of the
Taylor principle yields the same inequality as (31) in the case of the policy response to expected
future output. Figure 2 shows a determinacy region of policy coe±cients on expected future
in°ation and current output under the baseline calibration. Note that Case I is the empirically
relevant condition for determinacy because of (35) and Taylor principle (31), the latter of which
gives the lower bound on the in°ation coe±cient. The upper bound on the in°ation coe±cient
is induced by the ¯rst inequality in (36) for any output coe±cient less than a certain threshold
18given by the intersection of (35) and (36),20 while it is induced by (35) for any output coe±cient
greater than this threshold. This is in contrast with the case of the policy response to expected
future output, in which the determinacy interval narrows once the output coe±cient increases
beyond the threshold speci¯ed before. Thus, the policy response to current output is a much
better prescription for the indeterminacy problem than the one to expected future output.
Intuitively, this amelioration of the indeterminacy problem arises because current output falls
as a consequence of a rise in the real interest rate stemming from in°ationary expectations
and hence the policy response to this output subdues such a rate rise. Therefore, the policy
response to current output prevents the in°ationary expectations from becoming self-ful¯lling
and REE from being indeterminate.
4.2 Policy response to unemployment
We turn next to the second prescription, the forward-looking policy with responses to the
unemployment rate, i.e. ÁR = ÁY = 0 in (29). Analyzing the system's coe±cient matrix A
given in Appendix A yields the following necessary and su±cient condition for determinacy.
Proposition 5 If the forward-looking policy responds also to the unemployment rate, i.e. ÁR =
ÁY = 0 in (29), it ensures determinacy of REE if and only if either of the following two cases
is satis¯ed.
Case I: (37), (38), and (39) or (25) hold.
Á¼ +
Âu(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ U)
·[» ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ½)(» ¡ ´p)]
ÁU > 1; (37)
Á ¼ < 1 +
Â(1 + ¯)[2¾a1 + u½(1 ¡ »)(1 ¡ U)ÁU]
·fs c(2u ¡ ½)[» + ¯(1 ¡ ½)(» ¡ ´p)] ¡ 2¯¾a1(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ´p)g
; (38)
f3(f3 ¡ f1) + f2 > 1 or jf1j > 3; (39)
where a1 is given in Proposition 1 and fi, i = 1;2;3, are given in Appendix F.
Case II: the two strict inequalities opposite to (37) and (38) hold and (39) or the strict
inequality opposite to (25) holds.
Proof See Appendix F.
Percent changes in production are re°ected to a very large extent in percentage point
changes in the unemployment rate because of the relation ^ Ut = ¡(1 ¡ U)^ nt, where the steady
20This intersection appears at an in°ation coe±cient greater than ¯ve, so that the upper bound induced by
(35) does not appear in Figure 2.
19state unemployment rate is a very small number, e.g. U = 0:06 under the baseline calibration.
Thus, the policy response to the unemployment rate yields almost the same determinacy result
as the one to current output, since output also largely re°ects production. The intuition for
determinacy is also the same. Figure 3 illustrates the determinacy region of policy coe±cients
on expected future in°ation and current unemployment rates under the baseline calibration. As
is the case with the policy response to current output, (37) can be interpreted as the long run
version of the Taylor principle and provides the lower bound on the in°ation coe±cient, while
(38) and the ¯rst inequality of (39) induce the upper bound. Therefore, the policy response to
the unemployment rate, as well as the one to current output, is a better prescription for the
indeterminacy problem.
4.3 Interest rate smoothing
Finally, we consider whether interest rate smoothing can help the forward-looking policy gen-
erate determinacy of REE, i.e. ÁY = ÁU = 0 in (29). It seems hard to analytically examine
determinacy with this policy speci¯cation, since interest rate smoothing leads to a fourth order
characteristic equation for a system's coe±cient matrix, which has two predetermined vari-
ables, and hence determinacy requires that two solutions are outside the unit circle and the
remaining two lie inside the unit circle. There seems to be no general result about conditions
for that and thus we numerically investigate determinacy.
Figure 4 shows the determinacy region of policy coe±cients of in°ation and interest rate
smoothing under the baseline calibration. The long run version of the Taylor principle yields
Á¼ > 1¡ÁR, which provides the lower bound on the in°ation coe±cient. We can see that a suf-
¯ciently high degree of interest rate smoothing of ÁR = 0:3 or more brings about determinacy
as long as the long run Taylor principle is met. The intuition for determinacy is that inter-
est rate smoothing implies the policy responses to lagged interest rates and hence makes the
forward-looking policy respond also to current and past in°ation like the current-looking and
the backward-looking policies, which are likely to generate determinacy. Thus, determinacy is
guaranteed with interest rate smoothing. In sum, the forward-looking policy with su±ciently
strong interest rate smoothing is also a better prescription for the indeterminacy problem.
205 E-stability analysis of the indeterminacy problem
In this section we assess the indeterminacy problem induced by the forward-looking policy from
the perspective of E-stability. Speci¯cally, we examine whether the forward-looking policy
generates a unique E-stable fundamental REE even in cases of indeterminacy.21 Following
the literature, our E-stability analysis is based on the so-called \Euler equation" approach
suggested by Honkapohja, Mitra and Evans (2003): the rational expectations operator Et is
replaced with a possibly non-rational one ^ Et in the system of (13)¡(20). This system can be
reduced to a system of the form
F ~ xt = G ^ Et~ xt+1 + H^ nt¡1 + Jgt; (40)
where ~ xt = [^ ¼t ^ Ct ^ nt]0 and the coe±cient matrices F;G;H are given in Appendix G.22 Then,
fundamental RE solutions to system (40) are given by
~ xt = ¹ c + ¹ ©^ nt¡1 + ¹ ¡gt; (41)
where the coe±cient matrices are determined by
¹ c = 03£1; H = (F ¡ G¹ ©[0 0 1])¹ ©; ¹ ¡ = fF ¡ G¹ ©[0 0 1] ¡ ½ gGg¡1J:
Note that ¹ ¡ is uniquely determined given a ¹ ©, but ¹ © is not generally uniquely determined,
which induces multiplicity of fundamental REE.
Following Section 10.2 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), we analyze E-stability of funda-
mental REE.23 Corresponding to fundamental RE solutions (41), all agents are assumed to be
endowed with a perceived law of motion (PLM) of ~ xt
~ xt = c + ©^ nt¡1 + ¡gt: (42)
21Recall that in this paper we refer to Evans and Honkapohja's (2001) MSV solutions to linear RE models as
fundamental and do not undertake E-stability analysis of non-fundamental REE.
22The form of the vector J is omitted, since it is not needed in what follows.
23System (40) contains a predetermined variable ^ nt¡1, so that we can consider two learning environments,
which are studied respectively in Section 10.2 and 10.3 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). One environment
allows agents to use current endogenous variables in expectation formation, whereas the other does not. In this
paper we present only E-stability analysis with the latter environment, as in Bullard and Mitra (2002). This is
because any in°ation coe±cient that generates a unique E-stable fundamental REE in the latter environment
does so in the former one, as Kurozumi (2006) shows in the absence of the labor market frictions. An intuition
for this is that in forming future expectations, agents have more information by the current endogenous variables
and hence E-stability is more likely in the former environment than in the latter one. Another reason for our
focus on the latter environment is that the former induces a problem with simultaneous determination of the
expectations and current endogenous variables, which is critical to equilibrium under non-rational expectations
as indicated by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Bullard and Mitra (2002).
21Using a forecast from the PLM and the relation ^ nt = [0 0 1]~ xt to substitute ^ Et~ xt+1 out of (40)
leads to an actual law of motion (ALM) of ~ xt
~ xt = F¡1G(I + ©[0 0 1])c + F¡1(G©[0 0 1]© + H)^ nt¡1
+ F¡1fG(©[0 0 1]¡ + ½ g¡) + Jggt (43)
provided that F is invertible. Here, I denotes a conformable identity matrix. Then, a mapping
T from the PLM (42) to the ALM (43) can be de¯ned by
T(c;©;¡) =
¡
F¡1G(I + ©[0 0 1])c; F¡1(G©[0 0 1]© + H);
F¡1fG(©[0 0 1]¡ + ½ g¡) + Jg
¢
:
For a fundamental RE solution (¹ c; ¹ ©; ¹ ¡) to be E-stable, the matrix di®erential equation
d
d¿
(c;©;¡) = T(c;©;¡) ¡ (c;©;¡)
must have local asymptotic stability at the solution, where ¿ denotes a notional time. Then,
we have
DTc(c;©) = F¡1G(I + ©[0 0 1]);
DT©(©) = F¡1G([0 0 1]©I + ©[0 0 1]);
DT¡(©;¡) = F¡1G(½ gI + ©[0 0 1]):
Therefore, it follows that a fundamental RE solution (¹ c; ¹ ©; ¹ ¡) is E-stable if and only if all
eigenvalues of three matrices, DTc(¹ c; ¹ ©), DT©(¹ ©), DT¡(¹ ©; ¹ ¡), have real parts less than one.
We summarize this result in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the coe±cient matrix F is invertible. A fundamental RE solution to
the system of (13)¡(20) with the forward-looking policy, i.e. j = 1 in (12), is E-stable if and
only if all eigenvalues of three matrices, F¡1G('I + ¹ ©[0 0 1]), ' = 1; ½ g; ¹ ©3, have real parts
less than one, where ¹ ©3 is the third element of the RE solution vector ¹ ©.
With this lemma we investigate E-stability of fundamental REE numerically, since it seems
impossible to analytically solve the matrix equation for ¹ © in fundamental RE solutions (41)
and thus to obtain explicit conditions for E-stability. As pointed out by McCallum (1998),
distinct fundamental REE are obtained for di®erent orderings of stable generalized eigenvalues
of the matrix pencil for system (40).24
24In cases of indeterminacy, the baseline calibration shows order one or two indeterminacy and hence two or
three distinct fundamental REE.
22The E-stability analysis shows that in the presence of the labor market search and match-
ing frictions, the forward-looking policy generates a unique E-stable fundamental REE if the
policy response to expected future in°ation lies in one of two intervals, which both satisfy the
Taylor principle: 1 < Á ¼ < 7:25 and Á ¼ > 25:06.25 Only the policy response to expected future
in°ation in these intervals succeeds in guiding temporary equilibria under non-rational expec-
tations toward the unique E-stable REE. Because the ¯rst interval is wide enough to contain
all empirically relevant values, the result suggests that the indeterminacy problem induced by
the forward-looking policy is not critical from the perspective of E-stability or least-squares
learnability of fundamental REE.
This result is a generalization of Bullard and Mitra (2002), who examine the case of a
frictionless labor market to show that the forward-looking policy generates a unique E-stable
fundamental REE if and only if it meets the Taylor principle. In the presence of the labor
market search and matching frictions, the vacancy channel emerges and reduces the guiding
e®ect of the demand channel. As a consequence, multiple fundamental REE are E-stable if
the policy response to expected future in°ation lies in the intermediate one between the two
intervals of in°ation coe±cients that generate the unique E-stable REE.
6 Robustness analysis
In this section we analyze the robustness of our results obtained with the benchmark model
by introducing habit formation in consumption preferences or considering an alternative labor
market speci¯cation that is a more conventional one in previous studies.
6.1 Habit formation in consumption preferences
As noted before, the vacancy channel of monetary policy causes the forward-looking policy to
induce indeterminacy of REE because output supply recovers sluggishly relative to expected
future consumption demand after a tightening of the policy. This suggests that the indetermi-
nacy problem might be less severe when habit formation in consumption preferences is taken
into account, since such preferences imply that consumption demand adjusts sluggishly to real
25The price stickiness changes these intervals quantitatively. For instance, if ® = 0:5 (0:8), an in°ation
coe±cient in the interval of 1 < Á ¼ < 3:05 (20:93) or Á ¼ > 8:89 (77:71) generates a unique E-stable fundamental
REE.




where h 2 [0;1) measures (internal) habit persistence in consumption and the benchmark
model examined above is contained as the special case of h = 0. Then, the representative
household's optimality condition for consumption becomes
¸t = (Ct ¡ hCt¡1)¡¾ ¡ ¯h(EtCt+1 ¡ hCt)¡¾:
As predicted, indeterminacy becomes less likely with a large h. For instance, in the case of
h = 0:8, the interval of the policy response to expected future in°ation for which determinacy
is ensured widens to 1 < Á ¼ < 1:25.27 Yet, this interval is still very narrow and hence the
indeterminacy problem remains.28 The prescriptions for this problem examined above are still
e®ective for guaranteeing determinacy. Also, when E-stability is adopted as an REE selection
criterion, a unique E-stable fundamental REE is generated by active, but not too strong,
responses to expected future in°ation,29 suggesting that the indeterminacy problem is not
critical from the perspective of E-stability of fundamental REE.
6.2 Alternative labor market speci¯cation
In the benchmark model we assume that job destruction is exogenous and hiring is instanta-
neous. Previous studies, such as Trigari (2008), Walsh (2005) and Krause and Lubik (2007),
however, use a distinct labor market speci¯cation in which jobs are also endogenously destroyed
and new hires become productive in the subsequent period. This speci¯cation implies that con-
temporaneous employment adjustment takes place only via job destruction, rather than only
via job creation as in the benchmark model.30 In this subsection we use the alternative labor
26In a sticky price model with internal habit formation in consumption preferences, Walsh (2005) shows
that the labor market search and matching frictions a®ect the dynamics of real marginal cost to the e®ect of
augmenting the persistence in output and in°ation. This is not the case in the absence of the habit formation
as pointed out by Krause and Lubik (2007).
27Introducing habit persistence into the model with frictionless labor market of Bullard and Mitra (2002) and
Woodford (2003) shifts up the upper bound of the determinacy interval for the policy coe±cient from 25 (h = 0)
to 1,862 (h = 0:8).
28The current-looking and the backward-looking policies guarantee determinacy of REE under similar condi-
tions to those obtained with the benchmark model.
29This interval of policy responses becomes narrower with larger h. There is no second interval of very large
policy responses to expected future in°ation for which a unique E-stable fundamental REE is generated as in
the benchmark model.
30This speci¯cation of the labor market corresponds to early evidence that job loss rates rise strongly during
recessions. More recently, Shimer (2007) and Hall (2006) argue that estimates of job ¯nding rates account for
24market speci¯cation to examine the robustness of our results obtained with the benchmark
model.
Each worker-¯rm match surviving in period t produces at goods, which is a job-speci¯c
productivity level that is drawn from a distribution F with a positive support. There is
a threshold level of job productivity, denoted by ~ at, below which matches are discontinued.
Speci¯cally, at the beginning of the period, a fraction ½x of existing matches is destroyed
exogenously, and so is the share of remaining matches that fall below the productivity threshold.
Thus, the rate of job destruction is
½t = ½x + (1 ¡ ½x)F(~ at)
and the measure of search unemployment is
ut = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½t)nt¡1:
We assume that newly formed matches become productive only in the subsequent period. Then,
the aggregate production of the wholesale sector becomes
yt = (1 ¡ ½t)nt¡1H(~ at);
where H(~ at) = E[aja > ~ at] =
R 1
~ at a dF(a)=[1 ¡ F(~ at)], and the employment including hired,
but non-productive, workers evolves according to
nt = (1 ¡ ½t)nt¡1 + mt:
As before, the asset values of a matched ¯rm and worker can be used to obtain the job
creation condition and the wage equation from Nash bargaining. The asset value of a matched
¯rm is the current real net revenue plus the expected continuation value of the match. An
unmatched ¯rm pays the vacancy posting cost and produces in the next period with probability
(1 ¡ ½t+1)qt. Combining these ¯rm asset values yields the job creation condition
°
qt
= Et¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½t+1)
·





where w(¢) is the average wage which is de¯ned below. The asset value of a matched (un-
matched) worker is the wage (unemployment bene¯t) plus the expected present discounted
much of the changes in the unemployment rate, a ¯nding that motivates the constant separation rate in many
recent search and matching models. But this view is also contested; e.g. Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2008) ¯nd
that in°ows and out°ows of unemployment are both important in explaining cyclical unemployment variation.
The results in this subsection indicate that this debate is not relevant for the question about indeterminacy of
REE with interest rate policy.
25value of this worker's employment status in the next period. The Nash bargaining outcome







+ (1 ¡ ´)b:





1 ¡ F(~ at+1)
dF(a) = ´
·




+ (1 ¡ ´)b:
Substituting the wage equation, the job creation condition becomes
°
qt
= Et¯t;t+1(1 ¡ ½t+1)
½

















Log-linearizing these labor market conditions around the steady state and rearranging the
resulting equations yields







"F;~ a^ ~ at; (45)



















^ vt ¡ »^ µt
´
; (47)
»^ µt = ~ Â
³




^ Rt ¡ Et^ ¼t+1
´




^ ~ at = ¡
(°=q)(» ¡ ´p)
(1 ¡ ´)b ¡ (°=q)(1 ¡ ´p)
^ µt ¡ ^ zt; (49)
^ yt = s c ^ Ct + s v^ vt; (50)
where ~ Â ´ ¯(1¡½)H(~ a)Â > 0, and "H;~ a and "F;~ a are respectively the steady state productivity
elasticity of H and F at the threshold ~ a. Because current production now depends on past
rather than present matching activity, the expected value of a match depends on expected
future real marginal cost in the job creation condition (48). The log-linearized equilibrium
conditions are now given by (44)¡(50), the consumption Euler equation (17), the Phillips
curve (18) and interest rate policy (19).
26With the alternative labor market speci¯cation, we numerically investigate determinacy of
REE. Following Walsh (2005), it is assumed that idiosyncratic productivity shocks are drawn
from a log-normal distribution and are serially uncorrelated with zero mean and a variance
of 0:132. The exogenous job destruction rate is assumed equal to ½x = 0:068 following den
Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000). With these assumptions the value of the vacancy posting
cost is determined by the model's steady state relationships and is equal to ° = 0:06. Under
the baseline calibration, the current-looking and the backward-looking policies guarantee de-
terminacy of REE under similar conditions to those obtained with the benchmark model. The
forward-looking policy generates a determinate REE for any in°ation coe±cient in the interval
of 1 < Á¼ < 1:21, which changes little from the one obtained with the benchmark model. Thus,
the indeterminacy problem with the forward-looking policy remains.
Intuitively, this problem arises because changes in employment and output are persistent,
such that the monetary transmission mechanism contains a vacancy channel in addition to the
demand channel as in the benchmark model. Although the labor market speci¯cation examined
here is more complex than the one in the benchmark model, we can see from (44) and (45)
that contemporaneous adjustment of production to a decrease in consumption demand occurs
via a rise in the separation rate. But this also destroys employment available for production in
the subsequent period in (47). To meet an expected recovery of future consumption demand,
¯rms expand current vacancy creation to have new matches in production in the following
period. Thus, the rise in the separation rate and the rise in vacancies have opposing e®ects on
the labor market tightness in (46) and on future employment. However, to the extent that a
strong recovery of future consumption is expected, the current labor market tightens. This is
associated via the job creation condition (48) with a rise in expected future real marginal cost.
Thus, initial in°ation expectations can become self-ful¯lling.
Regarding the prescriptions for the indeterminacy problem induced by the forward-looking
policy, each policy response to current or expected future output, the unemployment rate, or
the lagged interest rate, in addition to expected future in°ation, yields a very similar deter-
minacy region as in the benchmark model illustrated in Figures 1¡4 respectively. Thus, these
prescriptions remain e®ective for overcoming the indeterminacy problem. When considering E-
stability as an REE selection criterion, the forward-looking policy with an in°ation coe±cient
in the intervals of 1 < Á ¼ < 14:83 and Á ¼ > 22:41 generates a unique E-stable fundamental
REE.
27In sum, even when we introduce habit formation in consumption preferences or even when
we consider the more conventional labor market speci¯cation, the ¯ndings obtained with the
benchmark model remain unchanged.
7 Concluding remarks
We have examined implications of search and matching frictions in the labor market for in°ation
targeting interest rate policy in terms of equilibrium stability. Such labor market frictions cause
sluggish adjustment of production capacity to changes in demand. As a consequence, a rise in
the real interest rate increases expected future real marginal cost and hence expected future
in°ation. Therefore, indeterminacy is likely under forward-looking policy, which adjusts the
interest rate in response solely to expected future in°ation. However, this indeterminacy can be
overcome if the policy adjusts the interest rate in response also to output or the unemployment
rate or if it contains interest rate smoothing. Further, if E-stability is adopted as an equilibrium
selection criterion, the forward-looking policy generates a unique E-stable fundamental rational
expectations equilibrium under active, but not so strong or extremely strong, responses to
expected future in°ation. These ¯ndings are robust even when we introduce habit formation in
consumption preferences or when we consider a more conventional labor market speci¯cation
used in previous studies.
28Appendix
A Coe±cient matrices in systems of form (21)
In the case of the forward-looking policy, i.e. j = 1 in (12), the coe±cient matrix A of system
(21) is given by
































[» ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ½)(1 ¡ ´p)A33]; A32 =
s c½(1 ¡ »)
½(1 ¡ ») ¡ s v
; A33 =
s v [½(1 ¡ ») ¡ (1 ¡ ½»=u)]
½(1 ¡ ») ¡ s v
;
­1 = Â[½(1 ¡ ») ¡ sv] + ­0(Á¼ ¡ 1); ­0 = ·(1 ¡ ½)f(1 ¡ ´p)[½(1 ¡ ») ¡ sv] ¡ (» ¡ ´p)sc=¾g:
Let A0
ij refer to the elements Aij under the forward-looking policy. Then, for the current-
looking policy, i.e. j = 0 in (12), the system's coe±cient matrix A is the same as (51), except
A1j = ~ A1j, where ~ A11 = (A0
11­1 ¡ ­0Á¼)=(­1 ¡ ­0Á¼), ~ A12 = A0
12­1=(­1 ¡ ­0Á¼), ~ A13 =
A0
13­1=(­1 ¡ ­0Á¼), and A21 = (Á¼ ¡ ~ A11)=¾, A22 = 1 ¡ ~ A12=¾, and A23 = ¡ ~ A13=¾. If the
forward-looking policy responds also to expected future output, i.e. k = 1, ÁR = ÁU = 0
in (29), the system's coe±cient matrix A is the same as (51), except A11 = A0
11(1 ¡ ­2),
A12 = A0
12(1 ¡ ­2) ¡ ­2¾=(Á¼ ¡ 1), A13 = A0
13(1 ¡ ­2), A2j = A0
2j¾=(¾ ¡ ÁY ), where ­2 =
­0ÁY (Á¼ ¡1)=fÂ[½(1¡»)¡s v](¾¡ÁY )+­0¾(Á¼ ¡1)g. Alternatively, when the forward-looking
policy responds also to current output, i.e. k = 0, ÁR = ÁU = 0 in (29), the system's coe±cient
matrix A is the same as (51), except A12 = A0
12 ¡(­0=­1)ÁY and A22 = A0
22 +ÁY =¾. Finally,
when the forward-looking policy responds also to the unemployment rate, i.e. ÁR = ÁY = 0 in
(29), the system's coe±cient matrix A is the same as (51), except A12 = A0
12 ¡(­0=­1)A32ÁY ,
A13 = A0
13 ¡ (­0=­1)A33ÁY , A22 = A0
22 + A32ÁY , and A23 = A0
23 + A33ÁY .
B Proof of Proposition 1
For the system's coe±cient matrix A given in Appendix A, we can show that its three eigen-
values are the solutions to the cubic equation
¹3 + b1¹2 + b2¹ + b3 = 0;
29where b1 = ¡1¡A0
11¡A33¡A0





1)=¾, and b3 = ¡A0
11A33.
Because determinacy of equilibrium obtains if and only if the coe±cient matrix A has exactly
one eigenvalue inside the unit circle and the other two outside the unit circle, it follows that
the necessary and su±cient condition for determinacy is that exactly two solutions to the cubic
equation above are outside the unit circle and one is inside the unit circle. By Proposition C.2
of Woodford (2003), this is the case if and only if either of the following two cases is satis¯ed.
(Case 1) b1 + b2 + b3 < ¡1; b1 ¡ b2 + b3 > 1;
(Case 2) b1 + b2 + b3 > ¡1; b1 ¡ b2 + b3 > 1; b3(b3 ¡ b1) + b2 ¡ 1 > 0 or jb1j > 3:
Then, because ­1 is a common denominator in these inequalities, (Case 2) can be reduced
to (22)¡(25) if ­1 > 0 and to (24) and the strict opposite of (22), (23) and (25) if ­1 < 0.
Likewise, (Case 1) can be reduced to (25) and the strict opposite of (22) and (23) if ­1 > 0
and to (22) and (23) and the strict opposite of (25) if ­1 < 0.
C Proof of Proposition 2
For the system's coe±cient matrix A given in Appendix A, we can show that its three eigenval-








13A32)[1 + ­0=(­1 ¡ ­0Á¼)]Á¼=¾ ¡ A0




13A32)­1Á¼=[(­1 ¡ ­0Á¼)¾], A0
1j and A3j are given in Appendix A, and
bi, i = 1;2;3, are given in Appendix B. The remainder of the proof proceeds in the same way,
mutatis mutandis, as in Appendix B.
D Proof of Proposition 3
For the system's coe±cient matrix A given in Appendix A, we can show that its three eigen-
values are the solutions to the cubic equation ¹3 + d1¹2 + d2¹ + d3 = 0, where d1 = b1 +
A0
11­2+[1+A0





13A32)(Á¼ ¡1)=¾](­2¾ ¡ÁY )=(¾ ¡ÁY ), d3 = b3 +A0
11A33(­2¾ ¡ÁY )=(¾ ¡ÁY ), A0
1j and A3j
are given in Appendix A, and bi, i = 1;2;3, are given in Appendix B. The remainder of the
proof proceeds in the same way, mutatis mutandis, as in Appendix B.
30E Proof of Proposition 4
For the system's coe±cient matrix A given in Appendix A, we can show that its three eigenval-
ues are the solutions to the cubic equation ¹3+e1¹2+e2¹+e3 = 0, where e1 = b1¡¯A0
11ÁY =¾,
e2 = b2 + A0
11(1 + ¯A33)ÁY =¾, e3 = b3(1 + ÁY =¾), A0
11 and A33 are given in Appendix A, and
bi, i = 1;2;3, are given in Appendix B. The remainder of the proof proceeds in the same way,
mutatis mutandis, as in Appendix B.
F Proof of Proposition 5
For the system's coe±cient matrix A given in Appendix A, we can show that its three eigenval-
ues are the solutions to the cubic equation ¹3+f1¹2+f2¹+f3 = 0, where f1 = b1¡¯A0
11A32(1¡
U)ÁU=¾, f2 = b2 + A0
11A32(1 ¡ U)ÁU=¾, f3 = b3, A0
11 and A32 are given in Appendix A, and
bi, i = 1;2;3, are given in Appendix B. The remainder of the proof proceeds in the same way,
mutatis mutandis, as in Appendix B.
G Coe±cient matrices in system (40)



























1j and A3j are given in Appendix A.
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35Table 1: Baseline calibration for our quarterly model
¯ discount factor 0.99
¾ risk aversion 1
² elasticity of substitution between retail goods 10
® probability of not reoptimizing price 0.67
´ worker bargaining power 0.5
» search elasticity of matches 0.4
q ¯rm matching rate 0.7
½ job destruction rate 0.1
U steady state unemployment rate 0.06
° °ow cost of a vacancy 0.06
½ g autoregressive coe±cient for preference shocks 0.35














Figure 1: Determinacy region of interest rate policy coe±cients on expected future in°ation and ex-
pected future output












Figure 2: Determinacy region of interest rate policy coe±cients on expected future in°ation and current
output












Figure 3: Determinacy region of interest rate policy coe±cients on expected future in°ation and un-
employment












Figure 4: Determinacy region of interest rate policy coe±cients on expected future in°ation and interest
rate smoothing
38